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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
LUIS A. GUZMAN : Case No. 20030019-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999), and aggravated kidnapping, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1999),1 in the Third Judicial 
District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, Judge, presiding.2 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002), which grants this Court jurisdiction over appeals from convictions 
for any crime other than a first degree or capital felony. 
1
 This statute was amended effective April 30, 2001. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (Supp. 
2002). However, because the events of this case occurred two weeks earlier, on April 18,2001, 
R. 5, the 1999 statute is referenced in this brief. 
2
 A copy of the minutes of the "Sentence, Judgment, Commitment" is included in 
Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE FIRST ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW. AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue: Cases such as State v. Long recognize that there is no correlation between an 
eyewitness's certainty of a suspect identification and the correctness of the identification. 
But in this case, the trial court allowed the alleged victim to testify that she was 
absolutely sure of her photo and line-up identifications of Appellant Luis Guzman. Also, 
a police officer testified that the alleged victim was "100 percent positive" of her 
identification. Did this violate Due Process? 
Standard of Review: "Whether a piece of evidence is admissible is a question of law, 
and we always review questions of law under a correctness standard." State v. Ramirez. 
817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991). Of course, in evaluating whether identification 
evidence is reliable, "the correctness review necessarily incorporates a review of the trial 
court's resolution of factual questions and the associated determination of credibility that 
may underlie the decision to admit. This subsidiary determination will be overturned only 
if clearly erroneous." Id (citations omitted). However, the overall standard is still one of 
correctness. Id. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved by written motion at R. 72-74. 
STATEMENT OF THE SECOND ISSUE. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. AND PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue: Utah and federal cases support that a cautionary jury instruction regarding a 
2 
witness's credibility should be given when the witness testifies as part of a plea bargain. 
Here, the witness was a former co-defendant who testified as part of a plea bargain 
arrangement. Mr. Guzman requested a cautionary instruction, but it was denied. Was this 
error? 
Standard of Review: As this Court has established, ff[w]hether the trial court's refusal to 
give a proposed jury instruction constitutes error is a question of law, which we may 
review for correctness." State v. Stringham. 2001 UT App 13, ^ Jl 1, 17 P.3d 1153. See 
also State v. Widdison. 2000 UT App 185,1J33,4 P.3d 100; State v. Riggs , 1999 UT 
App 271,1|7, 987 P.2d 1281. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved both by a written request for a jury instruction, 
R. 78, and oral exception to the exclusion of the instruction. R. 255 [291-92]. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional provisions are relevant on appeal: 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides, in 
pertinent part: 
nor shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law . . . . 
U.S. Const, amend. V. 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution, which provides: 
No person shall be deprived of live, liberty or property, without due 
3 
process of law. 
Utah Const, art 1, § 7. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 5, 2001, Mr. Guzman was charged by Information with aggravated 
robbery and aggravated kidnapping. R. 3-5. Notice was given that weapon and concerted 
action enhancements would be sought for each charge. IdL A preliminary hearing was set, 
but Mr. Guzman waived his right to the hearing and was bound over for trial. R. 25-26. 
He then pled not guilty to both charges. R. 27. 
Before trial, Mr. Guzman filed a "Motion in Limine to Preclude Reference to 
Eyewitness Confidence in Identification of Defendant." R. 72. In the Motion, Mr. 
Guzman requested a ruling barring the alleged victim, Claryn Miller, and all other 
witnesses, from testifying about Ms. Miller's level of confidence in her identification of 
Mr. Guzman as the perpetrator. IdL The Motion was made on four grounds. First, such 
testimony amounts to nothing more than Ms. Miller's opinion of her own accuracy. This 
kind of testimony is inadmissible under Rule 608 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. R. 72-
73. Second, science has shown that there is no correlation between the witness's level of 
confidence in an identification and its accuracy. R. 73. Third, jurors are generally not 
aware of this lack of correlation, and so testimony about the level of confidence is 
prejudicial. Id. Fourth, because Mr. Guzman is not entitled to call an expert witness to 
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present scientific testimony about the lack of correlation between confidence and 
accuracy, his ability to correct the prejudice is crippled. R. 73-74. 
The State objected to this Motion, arguing that the Utah Supreme Court did not 
emphasize the lack of a correlation between witness confidence and accuracy in State v. 
Long, 721 P.2d 483. R. 90. The State claimed that this means that confidence testimony 
is admissible. The State also opined that Mr. Guzman was attempting to gain recognition 
for a scientific principle without taking the trouble of bringing in a testifying expert. IcL_ 
And, the State said that Mr. Guzman was asking the trial court to weigh the credibility of 
evidence instead of evaluating its admissibility. Id. 
Immediately before trial, the trial court heard oral argument on the issue, and then 
denied the Motion. R. 253 [21]. The denial was based on the court's finding that the 
witness's confidence in her identification was a factor that the jury could legitimately 
consider in evaluating the identification evidence: 
I think the jury would want to know how confident the witness was in their 
identification. They may choose to disbelieve it. At least they are entitled to 
know how confident the witness is. If the witness's accuracy of the 
identification is going to be challenged, as I understand it will be in this 
case, I think the witness is entitled to state that. The same I would allow the 
defendant to cross examine on that, on the witness's own confidence. And 
so for that reason, plus the fact I think there is relevant evidence, I will give 
an appropriate instruction regarding those issues in accordance with the 
mandate of the Supreme Court 3 
3
 R. 253 [21-22]. The jury instructions did not include an instruction that a witness's 
confidence in her eyewitness identification does not correlate with the accuracy of that 
identification. 
5 
The case proceeded, and after the evidence was heard the court considered the 
matter of jury instructions. After some discussion, the court excluded a jury instruction 
that had been requested by Mr. Guzman. The instruction concerned the jury's evaluation 
of testimony by Mr. Guzman's co-defendant, who had testified as part of a plea-bargain 
arrangement. R. 78. The instruction emphasized that the jurors themselves are the sole 
judges of any witness's credibility, and then clarified that, in evaluating the testimony of 
a compensated witness, consideration should be given to factors such as the type of 
compensation received, whether the witness's testimony has ever changed, and the 
witness's criminal history. The instruction read as follows: 
You are hereby instructed that the testimony of an informer who provides 
evidence against a defendant must be examined and weighed by you with 
greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness. Whether the 
informer's testimony has been affected by interest or prejudice against the 
defendant is for you to determine. In making that determination, you should 
consider (1) whether the witness has received anything (including pay, 
immunity from prosecution, leniency in prosecution, personal advantage, or 
vindication) in exchange for testimony; (2) any other case in which the 
informant testified or offered statements against an individual but was not 
called, and whether the statements were admitted in that case, and whether 
the informant received any deal, promise, inducement or benefit in 
exchange for that testimony; (3) whether the informant has ever changed 
his or her testimony; (4) the criminal history of the informant; (5) any other 
evidence relevant to the informer's credibility. 
R.78. 
The trial court excluded this instruction. R. 255 [292]. In excluding it, the court 
acknowledged that the co-defendant was required to testify as part of a plea bargain 
arrangement, but noted that he was not paid money for the testimony. R. 255 [293]. Also, 
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the court said, the instruction required it "to advise the jury to pay special attention to a 
particular witness as opposed to all witnesses," and this is inappropriate. R. 255 [292-93]. 
The jury retired to deliberate and returned a verdict of guilty on both the 
aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery counts. R. 200-01. Mr. Guzman was 
sentenced to consecutive terms of six years to life imprisonment for aggravated robbery, 
and fifteen years to life for aggravated kidnapping. R. 221-22. He filed a timely Notice of 
Appeal. R. 228-29. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
About 6 o'clock on April 18, 2001, Claryn Miller left the restaurant Oceans, 
where she worked as a waitress, and drove home. R. 253 [124, 148]. Her home was a 
South Salt Lake townhouse that she shared with three other young women. Id. at 133, 
150. It had a garage with an automatic garage door opener, and was entered both from a 
front door and a garage door. Id. at 125, 154. 
As Ms. Miller approached the townhouse, she saw a man and a woman walking 
along the road. Id. at 125. The man was wearing a blue-and-white shirt with jeans. Id. at 
149. The woman was wearing a white tank top with "a blue zippy," short shorts with "big 
shoes," and her hair was pulled back. Id. Ms. Miller turned into her driveway, pressed the 
automatic garage door opener, and entered the garage. Id. at 125. Then she heard a knock 
on her car window. Id. at 126. She looked up and saw the man and woman who had been 
7 
walking along the road. Id. Ms. Miller rolled down the window. Id. The man lifted up his 
shirt, showed her a gun, and told her to close the garage door. IcL She did so. IdL Then the 
man pulled out the barrel of the gun, showed her it was loaded, and pointed it at her 
head. Id at 127. He told her to get out of the car. Id. at 127. 
As she got out of the car, she slipped her cell phone into her pocket, thinking that 
she could use it to call for help. Id. at 140. Unfortunately, he patted her, found the phone, 
and took it. Id. He also took her cigarettes. Id. Then he asked her for money. IcL She told 
him that her wallet was in her car. IdL He found it, looked inside, and saw only six 
dollars. Id Then he "chucked it" at her. IcL 
The man told his accomplice to "get the handcuffs out of the bag." IcL at 128. 
Apparently, however, she had forgotten the handcuffs. Id. at 128-29. So he told her to 
find something else to tie Ms. Miller. Id. The accomplice found some nylons in a box in 
the garage, forced Ms. Miller to lie face-down on the cement, and tied Ms. Miller's hands 
and feet. Id at 129, 167. During this time, the man kept the gun pointed at Ms. Miller. Id. 
He spoke partly in English and partly in Spanish, and kept telling Ms. Miller that he was 
looking for a man who owed him money and drugs. IcL at 127, 129. He yelled and 
cursed. Id at 132. Ms. Miller told him that no man lived there, but he did not believe her. 
Id at 127-28. 
The gunman left the garage and went into the house. IcL at 155. Soon after, she 
heard several other people moving around the house. Id. The gunman returned to garage 
8 
and left again several times. Id. at 157. At one point, three people she hadn't seen before 
came to the doorway of the garage and looked at her. Id. at 157, 168, 172. One was white 
and had a ffclown-jester-typeff tattoo on his eye. Id. at 135. The other was tall and bald. 
Id. at 134. The other had dark hair. Id. at 168, 172. They talked to the gunman and the 
woman with him, and it was apparent from their conversation that they had come to the 
wrong house. Id. at 133. Then the tall, bald man approached Ms. Miller, told her that 
they had come to the wrong house and that they were going to leave, and told everyone 
"not to touch" Ms. Miller. R at 134. 
All of the people left, but they did not untie Ms. Miller. Id. at 134-35. She laid 
there for about five minutes. Id. at 135. Then she worked herself free, went into the 
kitchen, and threw up. Id. at 135-36. 
Later, the police were called and Ms. Miller's roommates returned. Id. at 138-39. 
They all examined the home and found that it had been "torn through." Id_ at 158. 
Dresser drawers were opened and items were "thrown about." Id. Also, some rings and 
an old cell phone had been taken. Id. at 139-40. 
The responding officer helped the others look through the home. However, he did 
not take a witness statement from Ms. Miller, Id. at 160, nor did he interview any 
neighbors or other potential witnesses. R. 254 [186-88]. He did not secure the house as a 
crime scene because he felt that too much time had passed since the incident. Id. at 188. 
He did not look for the nylons used to tie Ms. Miller, nor did he ask her why she had 
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waited nearly two hours before contacting the police. IcL at 190-92. Eventually, a crime 
scene technician arrived and took a fingerprint from a dresser, but the print did not match 
Mr. Guzman. IcL at 195-97. 
A detective was assigned to the case. He interviewed Ms. Miller and got some 
descriptions of the people involved. IdL at 208. Then, on May 23 rd, more than a month 
after the incident, he met Ms. Miller at her workplace and showed her some photo line-
ups. IdL at 209-10. In one line-up,4 she identified Mr. Guzman as the gunman. IcL at 142-
43; R. 254 [210-11]; St. Ex. 1. She also said that, on a certainty scale of 1 to 10, she rated 
her identification a "10." R. 253 [142-43]. This was because the man in the photo had 
one eye that was "just kind of deformed," like the gunman's, and "[everything about his 
face" was consistent with her memory of the gunman. R. 253 [165]. The detective 
testified at trial that she said she was "100 percent positive" of her identification. R. 254 
[211]. 
However, the photos in the spread are mere photocopies, R. 254 [220-21], and 
some are more hazy than others. Id at 222. In fact, the most hazy photo is that of Mr. 
Guzman. Id; St. Ex. 1. This circumstance is contrary to accepted photo-identification 
guidelines. The guidelines indicate that the photographs should be as equal in terms of 
quality as possible to reduce the possibility of an inaccurate identification. R. 254 [223]. 
In another photo line-up shown by the detective, Ms. Miller identified one of the 
4
 The detective did not put this line-up together himself. R. 254 [220]. 
10 
men who had stood in the doorway of the garage. Id_ at 144; R. 254 [213]; St. Ex. 2. This 
was Mr. Guzman's co-defendant, Fernando Fernandez. R. 254 [213]. She rated her 
certainty of this identification a "six or seven." R. 253 [144]. She said that, although she 
hadn't seen this man very long, she could identify him because she "will never forget the 
tattoo," and "his face was really square," just like the man in the photo. Id. at 164. The 
detective also testified that her identification was based on the tattoos and the "square 
jaw line." R. 254 [214]. 
On January 29, 2002, more than nine months after the alleged robbery, Ms. Miller 
went to an in-person line-up. St. Ex. 3. Individuals were presented to her one-by-one, and 
she identified Mr. Guzman as the gunman. R. 146-47; St. Ex. 3. She testified at trial that 
she was 100 percent certain of this identification. R. 253 [147]. 
Then, on June 3, 2002, Mr. Guzman's trial was held. R. 253 [1]. There, Mr. 
Guzman's co-defendant, Mr. Fernandez, testified as part of a plea agreement that he had 
entered. R. 254 [242]. Mr. Fernandez had originally been charged with the same crimes 
as Mr. Guzman. That is, he was charged with aggravated robbery and aggravated 
kidnapping with weapons and concerted action enhancements.5 However, in exchange 
for his agreement to testify at Mr. Guzman's trial, he was offered one count of simple 
robbery. Id at 248. He accepted this offer and pled guilty to robbery. Id. This conviction 
5
 R. 3-5; R. 254 [248]. For these crimes he faced a potential five-to-life sentence on thi 
aggravated robbery charge, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999), fifteen-to-life sentence on the 
aggravated kidnapping charge, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1999), plus several years added to 
each charge for the enhancements. 
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carries a sentence of one to fifteen years, but Mr. Fernandez testified that he hoped to 
receive probation. R. 254 [248, 257]. 
At trial, Mr. Fernandez testified that he, along with seven other people including 
Mr. Guzman, went to the townhouse where Ms. Miller lived intending to commit 
robbery. Id. at 243-44. Mr. Fernandez and his companions thought the house was a drug 
house and they intended to steal cocaine and money. Id. Mr. Fernandez testified that Mr. 
Guzman and a woman, Miguella, approached the house first. Id. at 244. Everyone else 
sat in a van parked a short distance from the house. Id. at 244-46. Five to ten minutes 
later, Mr. Guzman called Mr. Fernandez on his cell phone. Id. at 246. Mr. Fernandez 
testified that Mr. Guzman said that they were at the wrong house. Id_ However, Mr. 
Fernandez and the others decided to go in the house anyway to see whether there was 
anything to take. IdL at 255. Mr. Fernandez said that the woman, Miguella, let them in.6 
Mr. Fernandez testified that, by the time he came in, "the house was ransacked." Id. at 
255. Then he went to doorway of the garage and saw "[a] white female tied up, sitting 
down." Id. at 247. Mr. Guzman was standing in front of her pointing the gun at her. Id_ at 
252. 
Then they all decided to leave. Mr. Fernandez testified that Mr. Guzman asked 
everyone whether he should kill Ms. Miller. Id. at 247. Mr. Fernandez said he told Mr. 
Guzman to "[ljeave her alone. She is cool." Id. As they were leaving, Mr. Fernandez took 
6
 Id. at 246. This is inconsistent with Ms. Miller's testimony. Ms. Miller emphasized that 
the woman never left the garage. R. 253 [153-54]. 
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a cell phone from a table. Id. at 251. 
Mr. Fernandez admitted at trial that he had told a different story to police earlier. 
In particular, he had told police that he was not in the house and that somebody else had 
taken the cell phone. IcL. at 250-51. He had also stated that the van was parked far away 
and he couldn't see the front door of the house from the van. R. 254 [265-67]. Finally, he 
admitted that he told different stories at different times hoping to get a plea bargain and 
minimize the punishment that he would receive for this crime. Id. at 259. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Mr. Guzman's conviction should be reversed and this case should be remanded 
for a new trial for two reasons. First, the trial court erroneously admitted evidence that an 
eyewitness was absolutely certain of her out-of-court identification of Mr. Guzman. 
Second, the trial court refused to give a cautionary instruction about the testimony of Mr. 
Guzman's co-defendant, who testified as part of a plea-bargain arrangement with the 
prosecutor. These two errors together resulted in prejudice, and this renders the result of 
the trial unreliable. So, this conviction should be reversed and the case remanded for a 
new trial without these errors. 
The first error involves the admission of testimony about Ms. Miller's certainty of 
her identification of Mr. Guzman. Specifically, the court allowed Ms. Miller to testify 
that she was "100 percent" certain of her line-up identification of Mr. Guzman. R. 253 
13 
[147]. The court also allowed her to testify that, on a certainty scale of one to ten, she 
was a "ten11 on her photo identification of Mr. Guzman. IcL. at 142-43. Further, the court 
allowed Officer Matt Jewkes, who had accompanied Ms. Miller during the photo and 
line-up identifications, to testify that she was absolutely certain of her identifications. R. 
254 [211]. 
All of this was improperly admitted. This is because it does not meet the threshold 
standard of reliability as required by the principle of Due Process. Scientific studies have 
shown that there is no correlation between a witness' certainty of an identification and 
the accuracy of the identification.7 And, as the United States Supreme Court recognized 
in Neil v. Biggers, the threshold showing of reliability must be met with regard to all 
eyewitness identification evidence. Neil v. Biggers. 409 U.S. 188, 197-99 (1972). 
The unreliability of certainty evidence has been well-recognized in Utah as well as 
in other state8 and federal9 jurisdictions. Most importantly, however, the Utah Supreme 
7
 See State v. Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4,1[16, 20 P.3d 265 ("this court has specifically rejected 
the "level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the [identification] confrontation as a factor 
to be used in determining the constitutional reliability of an identification."); State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991) (this court has rejected the Biggers suggestion that the level of 
certainty demonstrated by the witness is a factor in determining the reliability of an 
identification); State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483,490-91 (Utah 1986) (recognizing "a poor 
relationship between witness confidence and accuracy of identification). 
8
 People v.Wright 755 P.2d 1049, 1059 (Cal. 1988); Campbell v. State, 814 P.2d 1,4-5 
(Colo. 1991); Commonwealth v. Christie, 98 S.W.3d 485,490-91 (Ky. 2002); People v. Lee, 750 
N.E.2d 63, 65-66 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2001). 
9
 United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1400 (3rd Cir. 1991); United States v. Smithers, 
212 F.3d 306, 315 (6th Cir. 2000). 
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Court recognized in the cornerstone eyewitness identification case of State v. Long that 
there is a "poor relationship between witness confidence and accuracy of identification . . 
.." Long, 721 P.2d at 490-91. The Utah Supreme Court emphasized this again in at least 
two other cases,10 but has not directly ruled on the admissibility of such evidence. 
Because of the well-recognized and proven unreliability of certainty evidence, the 
certainty evidence should have been excluded in this case. Indeed, given the witness' 
insistence that she was "100 percent" certain of the line-up identification and a "10" on 
the certainty scale in the photo identification, this evidence was particularly harmful. A 
lay jury, not knowing that there is no correlation between a witness' certainty of an 
identification and the accuracy of the identification, would likely give great weight to 
such evidence. This circumstance violates Due Process. 
It also violates Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Under Rule 403, evidence 
should be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice. Utah R. Evid. 403 (2003). That is true here. Because a witness5 
certainty has no correlation to the accuracy of the identification, there is no probative 
value, but the danger of unfair prejudice is great. This is because, as stated in Long . most 
jurors are unaware of the problems with eyewitness identification evidence, and so they 
give such evidence undue weight. Long, 721 P.2d at 490. So, this evidence should not 
have been admitted in this case. 
10
 Hoffhine. 2001 UT 4, ^ 16; Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 781. 
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The second reason that Mr. Guzman's conviction should be reversed and this case 
remanded is that the trial court erred in failing to give the jury a cautionary instruction 
regarding the testimony of Mr. Guzman's co-defendant, Mr. Fernandez. Like Mr. 
Guzman, Mr. Fernandez had faced one count of aggravated robbery with weapon and 
concerted action enhancements, and one count of aggravated kidnapping with weapon 
and concerted action enhancements. R. 3-5. But Mr. Fernandez escaped these charges by 
pleading guilty to one count of robbery in exchange for his testimony at Mr. Guzman's 
trial. R. 254 [248]. This casts suspicion on Mr. Fernandez' testimony, particularly 
considering thai his testimony was different from the statements he originally gave 
police. IdL at 248-56, 259-71. 
In these circumstances, the trial court should have cautioned jurors to consider the 
leniency Mr. Fernandez received in exchange for his testimony, the changes in his 
statements, his criminal history, and other factors in evaluating his testimony. For years, 
this has been standard procedure in federal court. Most of the Circuit Courts have held 
that, when the testimony of a plea-bargaining accomplice is used at trial, the jury should 
be instructed to evaluate the testimony with caution.11 This is because, as the Federal 
Fifth Circuit Court has noted, "[i]t is difficult to imagine a greater motivation to lie than 
the inducement of a reduced sentence . . . " United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco. 826 F.2d 
11
 United States v. Dailev, 759 F.2d 192,200 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Insana. 423 
F.2d 1165, 1169 (2nd 1970); United States v. O'Keefe. 128 F.3d 885, 896 (5th Cir. 1997); United 
States v. Gundersen. 195 F.3d 1035, 1039 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Yarbrough. 852 F.2d 
1522, 1537-38 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Pilling, 721 F.2d286, 297 (10th Cir. 1983). 
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310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987). 
Further, such cautionary jury instructions are particularly needful because some 
safeguards on the use of accomplice testimony have been modified and even removed. 
For instance, as the Utah Supreme Court has recognized, it used to be that a defendant 
could not be convicted solely on the basis of the uncorroborated testimony of an 
accomplice. State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1319 (Utah 1986). But now, a defendant may 
be convicted on that basis. Id. Further, the holding of Bruton v. United States. which 
forbade the admission of a non-testifying co-defendant's confession in a joint trial, 
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136 (1968), has been significantly weakened. 
State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86,1J35-36, 55 P.3d 573. In light of these circumstances, plus 
the strong motivation of a plea-bargaining accomplice to lie, a cautionary instruction 
regarding the testimony should be given. Because one was not given here, this case 
should be reversed and remanded for a new trial with a cautionary instruction. 
ARGUMENT 
I. TESTIMONY ABOUT MS. MILLER'S CONFIDENCE IN HER 
IDENTIFICATION OF MR. GUZMAN DOES NOT MEET THE 
THRESHOLD STANDARD OF RELIABILITY 
The trial court erred in admitting testimony that Ms. Miller was absolutely certain 
of her photo and line-up identifications of Mr. Guzman. This is because, as has been 
recognized by the Utah Supreme Court, there is no correlation between an eyewitness' 
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certainty of her identification and the accuracy of the identification. State v. Long. 721 
P.2d 483, 490-91 (Utah 1986). Yet, most lay-persons think that there is a correlation, and 
give great weight to a witness' testimony that she is certain of her identification. IcL at 
490. This is particularly true in circumstances like those here. Here, Ms. Miller told the 
jury that she rated her certainty of her photo identification as a ff 10" on a scale of 1 to 10. 
R. 253 [142-43]. She also described herself as being "100 percent" positive of her line-up 
identification. R. 253 [147]. Further, Officer Jewkes testified that Ms. Miller said she 
was "100 percent positive" of her photo identification. R. 254 [211]. These testimonies 
were presented without explanation to the jury, despite the fact that there is no 
correlation between certainty and accuracy. 
This lack of correlation between certainty and accuracy has already been 
recognized by the Utah Supreme Court. In the cornerstone eyewitness identification case 
of State v. Long, the Court noted this lack of correlation: 
In one study, which found a poor relationship between witness confidence 
and accuracy of identification, the researchers concluded, "it is possible 
that the jurors' rate of belief is around 80% irrespective of the actual rate of 
witness accuracy." 
Id. at 490-91 (quoting G. Wells, R. Lindsay, T. Ferguson, Accuracy, Confidence, and 
Juror Perception in Eyewitness Identification, 64 J. Applied Psych. 440,447 (1979)). 
The Court also noted that jurors are usually unaware of such problems and so they give 
such testimony "great weight." IcL at 490. Because of this, the Court held, a cautionary 
jury instruction on the fallibility of eyewitness identification should be given whenever 
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eyewitness identification is a central issue in a case. Long. 721 P.2d at 492. 
The Long holding did not directly address the issue of whether a witness' 
certainty about an identification is admissible, or whether cautionary instructions should 
include language about the lack of a correlation between certainty and accuracy. This is 
because the witness' certainty of the identification was not at issue in Long. Id. at 484, 
492-95. However, Long specifically instructed that both cautionary instructions and a 
courts' approach to the presentation of eyewitness identification testimony should be 
improved whenever the opportunity arises.12 In other words, Long specifically invites 
improvements to the approach to eyewitness identification testimony regardless of the 
fact that not every facet of this issue was not covered in Long. What is more, because 
Long recognized the lack of correlation between certainty and accuracy in identification, 
the inadmissability of this evidence is strongly connoted. 
This is supported by cases that have been decided since Long. Since Long, the 
Court has emphasized at least twice that there is no correlation between an eyewitness' 
certainty of an identification and the accuracy of the identification. Most recently, this 
was recognized in State v. Hoffhine. In Hoffhine. an eyewitness identified the defendant 
12
 Long. 721 P.2d at 492-495. Specifically, the Long court noted that ff[w]e are convinced 
that, at a minimum, additional judicial guidance to the jury in evaluating such testimony is 
warranted." Id. at 492. It also noted that "[f]ull evaluation of the efficacy of cautionary 
instructions must await further experience," and "[pjerhaps, over time, the lessons of experience 
will demonstrate the inherent superiority of one type or form of cautionary instruction. But in the 
absence of such experience, we decline to dictate precisely what that instruction must say." Id. at 
492, 495. Finally, the court noted that it was allowing the "trial court and counsel some latitude 
in formulating instructions." W. at 492. 
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at a "showup" on the night of the crime. State v. Hoffhine. 2001 UT 4, f7, 20 P.3d 265. 
At the "showup," the witness sat in a police car while the police brought two suspects 
within ten-to-fifteen feet of the car and shined spotlights on them. Id_ The witness, rating 
his certainty as a nine-and-a-half on the ten-point certainty scale, identified one of the 
suspects as the robber. IcL at \l. However, at the preliminary hearing, the witness 
testified that he was no longer sure of the identification. Id. at [^9. 
The defense counsel made a motion to suppress the identification evidence, and 
the trial court agreed that the identification was unreliable. Id. at ^ flO. Nonetheless, the 
court allowed into evidence the underlying facts and circumstances of the "showup." Id_ 
The court reasoned that, even though the identification was not reliable, it had, 
essentially, resulted in a "non-identification of the defendant." IdL at 16. So, admission of 
the facts and circumstances would do no harm. Id. 
On review, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that this admission was error. Id. at 16. 
The Court pointed out that "this court has specifically rejected the 'level of certainty 
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation' as a factor to be used in determining 
the constitutional reliability of an identification.'" Id. (quoting State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
774, 781 (Utah 1991) and Long. 721 P.2d at 490). So, "even though the showup 
'resulted in a non-identification,' it was erroneous for the trial court to admit evidence of 
the showup procedure after granting the motion to suppress and concluding that the 
showup was suggestive and did not satisfy the Ramirez factors for constitutional 
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reliability." Id 
Another case that recognized the lack of correlation between an eyewitness' 
certainty of an identification and the accuracy of the identification was State v. Ramirez. 
In that case, the Court set out guidelines for determining when eyewitness identification 
evidence is so unreliable that it should not be admitted. State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 
782-84 (Utah 1991). The Court listed several factors, and also evaluated the factors set 
out in the federal counterpart case of Neil v.Biggers. which was decided by the United 
States Supreme Court. IcL at 781. The Biggers factors, the Utah Supreme Court noted, 
are generally comparable to the cautionary jury instructions given in Long, but the Long 
factors differ in some respects. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781. In particular, the Long factors 
do not include "the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation." 
Id. (quoting Biggers. 409 U.S. at 199). This is because, "[i]n Long. we criticized this 
factor and essentially rejected it as an indicator of an identification's reliability." Id. Asa 
result, a witness' high degree of certainty of an identification is irrelevant to whether the 
evidence is reliable, and therefore, admissible.13 
13
 Id The Ramirez Court based its reliability holdings on the due process clause of article 
I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. Id at 780. In doing so, the Court noted, it did not limit itself 
"to an analytic model that merely copies the federal." Id, Instead, it followed the "more 
empirically based approach of Long " Id It also expressed assurance that "the resulting 
reliability determination will meet or exceed in rigor the federal standard as expressed in Biggers 
and Stovall." Id. 
The factors for reliability set out in Ramirez include: 
(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; 
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The Utah Supreme Court's recognition that there is no correlation between a 
witness' certainty of an identification and the identification's accuracy is soundly based. 
Long itself based its recognition on a study published in Applied Psychology ,14 but this is 
only the tip of the iceberg. Since Long, several studies have emphasized the lack of 
correlation between certainty and accuracy. 
For instance, in 1995 the American Psychological Association sponsored a thesis 
that emphatically confirmed not only the lack of correlation between confidence and 
accuracy, but also jurors' heavy reliance on confidence testimony. The authors reviewed 
many tests and studies conducted by reputable private psychological associations, and 
compared the results. Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness 
Accuracy: Assenssing Their Forensic Relation, 1 Psych. Pub. Pol. and L. 817, 818-40 
(1995). They concluded that confidence testimony contributes strongly to the 
unreliability of eyewitness identification evidence. Specifically, they concluded: 
1. Jurors appear to overbelieve eyewitnesses. 
(2) the witness' degree of attention to the actor; 
(3) whether the witness had the capacity to observe the actor during the event; 
(4) whether the witness' identification was made spontaneously and remained consistent 
thereafter; 
(5) whether the witness' identification was the product of suggestion. 
Id at 782-84. 
14
 Long, 721 P.2d at 491. 
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2. Jurors apparently have difficulty reliably differentiating accurate from 
inaccurate eyewitnesses. 
3. Jurors are not adequately sensitive to aspects of witnessing and 
identification conditions that are arguably better predictors of witness 
accuracy than is witness confidence. 
4. A major source of juror unreliability is their reliance on witness 
confidence, which (a) is a weak indicator of eyewitness accuracy even 
when measured at the time an identification is made and under relatively 
"pristine" laboratory conditions and (b) appears to be highly malleable and 
influenced by postidentification factors such as repeated questioning, 
briefings in anticipation of cross-examination, and feedback about the 
behavior of other witnesses. These factors cannot increase witness accuracy 
and are therefore likely to further reduce any relation between witness 
confidence and accuracy. 
Id at 830. 
In another study, psychologists studied the confidence and accuracy of 
eyewitnesses as it is affected by both simplified questioning and complicated questioning 
that is typical of legal circumstances. Mark Kebbell & David Giles, Some Experimental 
Influences of Lawyers' Complicated Questions on Eyewitness Confidence and Accuracy. 
134 Journal of Psychology 129 (March 2000). The results were instructive. It was found 
that confidence and correctness correlated fairly well in the simplified condition, but not 
in the more complicated condition: 
For the simplified condition, participants were significantly more confident 
in correct answers than in incorrect answers, but this was not the case for 
the confusing condition. Participants were not significantly more confident 
in correct answers than they were in incorrect answers. Worse still, this 
effect did not occur because answers were generally given with low levels 
of confidence. Instead, participants were more confident in incorrect 
answers in the confusing condition than in the simplified condition. Thus, 
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the worst scenario for the criminal justice system occurred. Witness were 
highly confident and wrong. 
One article, written for the American Judges Association, compiled the results of 
different studies and noted the strong effect of witness confidence on jurors: 
Eyewitness testimony, when delivered in a confident manner by a witness, 
may be more convincing to jurors than any other type of evidence. When a 
witness declares, "That's the man I saw, right there!" most jurors are 
persuaded that the identification is accurate. After all, the witness was 
there: why would he or she be mistaken? This strong belief by jurors in the 
accuracy of eyewitnesses has been demonstrated time after time by research 
studies. Yet there is a major problem concerning eyewitness evidence. 
Knowledgeable legal scholars and social scientists have noted that not only 
is eyewitness evidence powerful, it is also more likely to be erroneous than 
any other type of evidence. 
John Brigham, Adina Wasserman & Christian Meissner, Disputed Eyewitness 
Identification Evidence: Important Legal and Scientific Issues« 36 Court Review 1, 12 
(1999) (emphasis in original). 
Additionally, the lack of a correlation between an eyewitness5 certainty of an 
identification and the identification's accuracy has been well-recognized in many 
jurisdictions. The California Supreme Court recognizes the lack of a correlation, and 
even notes that some studies show an inverse relationship between the degree of certainty 
and the accuracy of an identification.15 That Court has said: 
15
 People v. Wright 755 P.2d 1049, 1159 (Cal. 1988). The Long Court also noted that 
,fthe accuracy of an identification is, at times, inversely related to the confidence with which it is 
made." Long. 721 P.2d at 490. 
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there is in fact a "lack of correlation between the degree of confidence an 
eyewitness expresses in his identification and the accuracy of that 
identification. Numerous investigations of this phenomenon have been 
conducted: the majority of recent studies have found no statistically 
significant correlation between confidence and accuracy, and in a number 
of instances the correlation is negative - i.e., the more certain the witness, 
the more likely he is mistaken (Wells & Murray, Eyewitness Confidence, in 
Eyewitness Testimony: Psychological Perspectives, pp. 159-162). Indeed, 
the closer a study comes to reproducing the circumstances of an acutal 
criminal investigation, the lower is that correlation (id. At pp. 162-165), 
leading the cited authors to conclude that "the eyewitness accuracy-
confidence relationship is weak under good laboratory conditions and 
functionally useless in forensically representative settings." (IcL_ At p. 165; 
see also Deffenbacher, Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: Can We 
Infer Anything about their Relationship? (1980) (4 Law & Human Behav. 
243). 
Wright 755 P.2d at 1071. 
Other state courts, including the Supreme Courts of Colorado,16 Kentucky,17 and 
New York,18 have held that, whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue, expert 
testimony must be admitted to show the lack of a correlation between an eyewitness' 
certainty of an identification. Even federal courts like the 3 rd and 6th Circuits, which are 
governed by the Biggers standard stating that a witness' certainty positively affects 
reliability,19 have recognized the misleading effect of an eyewitness' certainty of an 
16
 Campbell v. People, 814 P.2d 1, 7 (Colo. 1991). 
17
 Commonwealth v. Christie. 98 S.W.3d 485,490-91 (Ky. 2002). 
18
 People v. Lee. 750 N.E.2d 63, 65-66 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2001); People v. Drake. 728 
N.Y.S.2d 636, 639-42 (2001). 
19
 Neil v. Biggers. 409 U.S. 188,199 (1972). 
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identification. Because of this, these courts have required expert testimony on the 
subject.21 
In Utah, recent rulings make the argument for excluding certainty evidence 
stronger. This is because, in the past two years the Utah Supreme Court has limited 
defense counsels' ability to present expert testimony on the lack of correlation between 
certainty and accuracy. In State v. Butterfield. State v. Maestas. and State v. Hubbard, the 
Court said that the admission of expert testimony on the deficiencies of eyewitness 
testimony is within the discretion of the trial court, and is not mandatory even when 
identification is a central issue in the case.22 Of course, there is some disagreement within 
the Court on this subject. Chief Justice Durham has opined that, at least where an 
expert's testimony "is particularly crucial for the fact finder," expert testimony should be 
allowed. Maestas. 2002 UT 123, ]f22. But in any event, it is apparent that defense 
counsels' ability to present expert testimony has been limited. So, the general reliability 
of the eyewitness identification testimony is even more crucial now than it was before. In 
20
 United States v. Mathis. 264 F.3d 321, 341-42 (3rd Cir. 2001); United States v. Stevens. 
935 F.2d 1380, 1400 (3rd Cir. 1991); United States v. Smithers. 212 F.3d 306, 315 (6th Cir. 2000). 
21
 But see United States v. Lumpkin. 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that 
expert testimony on lack of correlation between confidence and accuracy in eyewitness 
identifications intruded too much on the province of the jury as fact-finder); United States v. 
Smith. 156 F.3d 1046, 1053-54 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding the district court did not abuse its 
discretion when it excluded expert testimony on the lack of correlation between confidence and 
accuracy in eyewitness identifications). 
22
 State v. Maestas. 2002 UT 123,1J62-69, 63 P.3d 621; State v. Hubbard. 2002 UT 45, 
fl4, 48 P.3d 953; State v. Butterfield. 2001 UT 59,1J41-44, 27 P.3d 1133. 
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these circumstances, unreliable portions of the testimony, such as a witness' certainty of 
an identification, should not be admitted.23 
In this case, evidence of Ms. Miller's confidence in her photo and line-up 
identifications of Mr. Guzman was erroneously admitted. This evidence should not have 
been admitted because identification was a central issue in the case,24 and so the 
23
 The lack of expert testimony is particularly damaging with regard to a witness' 
testimony that she is certain of her identification. This was shown in a thesis presented by the 
American Psychological Association in 1995. In that thesis, the results of many studies, tests, and 
surveys conducted by a number of psychological associations were compared and analyzed. 
Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy: Assenssing Their 
Forensic Relation. 1 Psych. Pub. Pol. And L. 817, 818-40 (1995). The thesis concluded, in part, 
that a witness' confidence played a large role in jurors' evaluation of eyewitness identification 
evidence. Id. at 819-20. Further, expert testimony on the lack of correlation between confidence 
and accuracy tended to desensitize jurors to the confidence factor without creating general 
skepticism towards the eyewitness identification itself. Id. at 840-41. The thesis stated: 
It is clear that jurors possess some knowledge of the effects of some factors, such 
as disguise, retention interval, and suggestive lineup instructions. However, jurors 
are unaware of the influence of other factors, such as weapon visibility and 
confidence. Thus, poor knowledge is partly responsible for the lack of juror 
sensitivity. Evidence for problems of integration skills emerges from the findings 
that effects of witnessing and identification factors on knowledge dimensions 
were not translated into effects on inference and decision making. Thus, the lack 
of appropriate knowledge and poor integration skills jointly contribute to produce 
poor juror sensitivity to eyewitness evidence. Expert testimony improved juror 
knowledge, sensitized jurors to witnessing and identification conditions, and 
desensitized them toward witness confidence without promoting skepticism 
toward the eyewitness identification. These results provide support for the use of 
expert psychological testimony in eyewitness cases. Indeed, the results indicate 
that expert testimony on eyewitness memory can work to the benefit of the 
prosecution as well as the defense. 
14 
24
 See R. 171-73 (Long instruction given to the jury recognizes that "[a]n important 
question in this case is the identification of the defendant as the person who committed the 
crime.") Also, the defense in the case was that Mr. Guzman was mistakenly identified. R. 72-74, 
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reliability of the identification evidence was crucial. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199. And, as 
has already been shown, a witness' confidence in her identification does not have a 
reliable correlation with the accuracy of the identification. 
What is more, confidence testimony is particularly damaging in this case because 
Ms. Miller testified that she was absolutely certain of her identifications. R. 253 [142-43, 
147]. And as psychological studies have shown, testimony of 100 percent certainty 
makes a dramatic impact on jurors' evaluation of the evidence, regardless of the 
questionable nature of other circumstances surrounding the identification. Steven Penrod 
& Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy: Assessing Their Forensic 
Relation. 1 Psych. Pub. Pol. And L. 817, 821-22 (1995). In fact, studies show that jurors 
tend to ignore questionable circumstances surrounding an identification when a witness 
professes a high degree of certainty of her identification. Id. Here, Ms. Miller's 
profession of 100 percent certainty in her identification likely led the jury to ignore some 
of the questionable factors of the identifications in this case. 
Specifically, in the photo line-up shown to Ms. Miller, some of the photos are 
quite clear, and others are hazy. St. Ex. 1; R. 254 [222]. Indeed, Mr. Guzman's photo is 
the most hazy. Id. This is inappropriate because the photos should be of equal quality to 
reduce the possibility of a misidentification. R. 254 [223]. Further, Officer Jewkes, who 
presented the photo and in-person line-ups, did not get much descriptive information 
253 [119]. 
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about Ms. Miller's assailant before obtaining the photo line-up. Id. at 229. The only 
descriptive information he could recall is that the assailant was a Hispanic male. IcL_ 
However, it is important to get as detailed a description as possible before making a 
photo line-up.25 So, the preparation for the line-up was inadequate. 
Besides these questionable circumstances, the circumstances of Ms. Miller's 
encounter with the assailant likely did not receive adequate consideration by the jury. In 
particular, the high stress level felt by Ms. Miller, which likely reduced her perceptual 
abilities,26 was probably not given adequate consideration. 
In short, the admission of evidence of Ms. Miller's certainty about her 
identification was error because it is, itself, unreliable and also because such evidence 
causes juries to give undue weight to identification testimony regardless of the 
circumstances. Because of this, Mr. Guzman's conviction should be reversed and this 
25
 Id. at 228. Of course, Officer Frank Fisher, who first responded to the scene, testified 
that Ms. Miller told him that the assailant was about 5'5" with a medium build, short dark hair, 
and dark eyes. R. 254 [201-02]. However, this would not be helpful preparing a photo line-up or 
in supporting the choice of Mr. Guzman from the line-up because the photo line-up shows only 
heads and does not show height or build. St. Ex. 1. Further, the photo line-up shows black-and-
white copies of photos, so hair and eye color cannot be identified. Id. 
Ms. Miller testified that she told officers before the line-up that the assailant had "a lazy 
eye," just like Mr. Guzman did in the photo. R. 253 [164]. She said that this was one of the ways 
she could identify him in the photo. Id However, neither of the officers who testified 
remembered Ms. Miller saying this before the line-ups. R. 254 [201-02, 229-30]. Further, Mr. 
Guzman does not appear to have a lazy eye when viewed in person. R. 255 [311]. 
26
 See Long. 721 P.2d at 488-89 ("Another limitation which can affect perception is the 
emotional state of the observer. Contrary to much accepted lore, when an observer is 
experiencing a marked degree of stress, perceptual abilities are known to decrease significantly.11) 
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case remanded for a new trial. 
There are two legal basis for this action. The first is the principle of Due Process, 
and the second is Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
With regard to federal Due Process, the United States Supreme Court recognized 
in Neil v. Biggers that the admission of eyewitness identification evidence may violate 
Due Process in some circumstances. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 197-98. This is because some 
identification procedures may be unnecessarily suggestive, and this renders the 
identification evidence unreliable. Id. at 198. When this occurs, the appropriate action is 
a reversal and a remand for a new trial without the evidence. IdL. at 201. This was also the 
approach taken in Long and its progeny.27 In this case, Mr. Guzman's conviction should 
be reversed and this case remanded because testimony about Ms. Miller's certainty of her 
identification was unreliable and it undermined the jury's objective consideration of the 
eyewitness identification evidence. 
State Due Process offers even stronger protection against unreliable eyewitness 
identification. The Utah Supreme Court case of State v. Ramirez establishes that the Due 
Process clause of article I, section 7 requires a more focused inquiry into the reliability of 
eyewitness identification evidence than the federal counterpart. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 
781-82. Ramirez noted that the Long opinion "laid the foundation for a separate Utah 
constitutional due process analysis of the reliability of eyewitness identifications." Id. at 
27
 Long, 721 P.2d at 495; Snyder, 932 P.2d 120, 127 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
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779. Specifically, Long did not limit itself to the same reliability factors set forth under 
the federal due process clause, and consideration of these factors is necessary under 
article I, section 7. Id In Long. Ramirez, and later in State v. Hoffhine, the Court noted 
that it had "specifically rejected the ievel of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the 
confrontation' as a factor to be used in determining the [state] constitutional reliability of 
an identification. Hoffhine. 2001 UT 4. This demonstrates that the unreliability of 
confidence evidence is well-recognized in Utah. Further, the introduction of this 
testimony has such great potential for misleading a lay jury that it violates Utah Due 
Process. 
Secondly, admission of the certainty evidence violates Rule 403 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence. Under Rule 403, evidence may be excluded if its practical value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice that it creates: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 403 (2003). And, as Professor Edward Kimball and Judge Ronald Boyce 
explained in Utah Evidence Law, "[u]nfair prejudice has to do primarily with emotional 
reaction that might lead the jury to find guilt or responsibility where it otherwise would 
not, because of antipathy toward a person or because of consideration of proof in an 
inappropriate way." Edward Kimball & Ronald Boyce, Utah Evidence Law. 4-11 (1996). 
In this case, evidence that Ms. Miller was completely certain of her identifications 
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of Mr. Guzman has no probative value. As has already been shown, there is no 
correlation between certainty and accuracy, and so evidence of Ms. Miller's certainty was 
not helpful to the jury in evaluating eyewitness identification evidence. Further, as 
studies have shown, the certainty evidence was highly likely to prejudice the jurors' 
consideration of the identification evidence as a whole. This is because jurors tend to 
ignore the other circumstances surrounding the identifications once they learn of a 
witness' absolute certainty of the identifications. Because of this, the inclusion of these 
testimonies was error. 
Further, this error was prejudicial because thee principal identification evidence 
was the testimony and identifications of Ms. Miller. R. 253 [126-27, 142-43, 145, 146]; 
254 [215, 229]. But this is undermined by the trial court's admission of Ms. Miller's 
testimony that she was absolutely certain of her identifications. As already shown, there 
is no correlation between confidence and accuracy, but confidence testimony is given 
great weight by a jury. Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness 
Accuracy: Assessing Their Forensic Relation. 1 Psych. Pub. Pol. and L. 817, 830 (1995). 
So, Mr. Guzman's conviction should be reversed and this case remanded for a new trial 
without this testimony.28 
28
 The cumulative effect of both the certainty evidence and the failure to give the 
cautionary instruction is shown in Section III: The Cumulative Errors in This Case Resulted in 
Prejudice. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE THE JURY A 
CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION ABOUT THE TESTIMONY OF MR. 
FERNANDEZ, WHO TESTIFIED AS PART OF A PLEA BARGAIN 
A cautionary instruction about Mr. Fernandez' testimony was needed in this case 
because of some questionable aspects of his testimony. Most particularly, Mr. Fernandez 
did not testify by uninfluenced choice. Instead, he testified as part of a plea bargain that 
he entered with the State. Originally, he was charged along with Mr. Guzman, and faced 
one count of attempted aggravated robbery with weapon and concerted action 
enhancements, and one count of attempted aggravated kidnapping with weapon and 
concerted action enhancements. R. 3-5. For these crimes he faced a potential five-to-life 
sentence on the aggravated robbery charge, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999), fifteen-
to-life sentence on the aggravated kidnapping charge, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 
(1999), plus several years added to each charge for the enhancements.29 But the State 
offered him one count of simple robbery in exchange for his plea and his promise to 
testify against Mr. Guzman at trial. R. 254 [248]. He accepted this offer and pled guilty 
to simple robbery. Id This conviction carries a sentence of one to fifteen years, but Mr. 
Fernandez testified that he hoped to receive probation at his sentence, which had not yet 
been held at the time of Mr. Guzman's trial. R. 254 [248, 257]. 
Besides the fact that Mr. Fernandez was testifying in order to receive leniency 
from the justice system, Id. at 259, other aspects of Mr. Fernandez' testimony show that 
29
 Mr. Guzman ultimately received a total of 21 years to life for these crimes. R. 221-22. 
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his statements are not particularly trustworthy. For instance, in his original statement to 
the police, he said he was not at the house during the robbery and kidnapping. Id_ at 250. 
But at Mr. Guzman's trial, he said that he was. IcL Also, in his original statement to the 
police, he said that Mr. Guzman had taken a cell phone from the house. Id. at 251. But at 
trial, he said he had taken the phone. IdL at 250. Further, before trial he had named two 
individuals who knew about the crime and were with him beforehand. IdL at 260. But at 
trial, he said that these individuals knew nothing about the crime. Id. Even further, in his 
statement to the police he said that at the time of the crime he was in a van parked near 
the house and he could not see the front door. IcL at 265-66. At trial, he said that he could 
see the front door and that he saw Mr. Guzman and another accomplice enter the house. 
Id. at 267. In sum, Mr. Fernandez admitted that he lied a number of times about this 
incident to the police and others. Id. at 259. 
There are other worrying aspects of his testimony. For one, Mr. Fernandez 
testified that he already knew who the police considered suspects before giving 
interviews, Id. at 261, and before naming his accomplices. Id. at 262-64. Also, his 
testimony differs in some significant ways from the testimony of Ms. Miller, the alleged 
victim. Most notably, Mr. Fernandez testified that when he saw Ms. Miller in the garage, 
she was sitting down with her hands tied behind her back. Id. at 247,274. In his 
statement to the police, he had said she was standing up. Id. On the other hand, Ms. 
Miller testified that, during the incident, she was on her stomach with her hands and feet 
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tied behind her back. R. 253 [153-56]. Further, Mr. Fernandez testified that there were a 
total of eight people, including himself, who were involved in the robbery and 
kidnapping, Id. at 243, and that everyone except the van driver, Pablo, went into the 
house and into the garage during the incident. Id_ at 246, 269. On the other hand, Ms. 
Miller testified that she saw a total of only five people. R. 253 [171]. 
All of this shows that Mr. Fernandez' testimony, while technically admissible, was 
not necessarily trustworthy. In these circumstances, the judge should not have refused 
Mr. Guzman's request for a cautionary jury instruction. The instruction requested was as 
follows: 
You are hereby instructed that the testimony of an informer who provides 
evidence against a defendant must be examined and weighed by you with 
greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness. Whether the 
informer's testimony has been affected by interest or prejudice against the 
defendant is for you to determine. In making that determination, you should 
consider (1) whether the witness has received anything (including pay, 
immunity from prosecution, leniency in prosecution, personal advantage, or 
vindication) in exchange for testimony; (2) any other case in which the 
informant testified or offered statements against an individual but was not 
called, and whether the statements were admitted in that case, and whether 
the informant received any deal, promise, inducement or benefit in 
exchange for that testimony; (3) whether the informant has ever changed 
his or her testimony; (4) the criminal history of the informant; (5) any other 
evidence relevant to the informer's credibility. 
R. 78. This instruction is sound. It is patterned after the instructions generally used in 
federal cases in similar situations,30 and it cautions the jury to carefully evaluate the 
testimony without implying that the testimony is unbelievable. R. 255 [291-92]. 
See United States v. Bradfield. 113 F.3d515, 521 (5th Cir. 1997). 
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The use of this instruction is supported by federal and Utah case law, and the rules 
of evidence. In the federal law, such an instruction is required whenever an accomplice 
testifies as part of a plea bargain. As far back as the 1980s, a cautionary jury instruction 
was required whenever an accomplice testifies as part of a plea bargain. This is because, 
as the Fifth Circuit Court has observed, such witnesses have a remarkably strong 
motivation to lie: 
No practice is more ingrained in our criminal justice system than the 
practice of the government calling a witness who is an accessory to the 
crime for which the defendant is charged and having that witness testify 
under a plea bargain that promises him a reduced sentence. It is difficult to 
imagine a greater motivation to lie than the inducement of a reduced 
sentence, but courts uniformly hold that such a witness may testify so long 
as the government's bargain with him is fully ventilated so that the jury can 
evaluate his credibility. 
United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco. 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5 th Cir. 1987). 
Nonetheless, this does not mean that no precautions should be taken against the 
fact that those testifying as part of a plea bargain have a strong motivation to lie. As the 
2nd Circuit Court has noted, the fact that a witness hopes to receive leniency in his 
conviction or sentence does not disqualify him as a witness, but it does justify close 
evaluation of his credibility. United States v. Insana. 423 F.2d 1165, 1168 (2 nd Cir. 
1970). To aid the jury in this evaluation, most circuits have held, careful cross-
examination of the witness, as well as a cautionary jury instruction, is necessary.31 
31
 Id; United States v. Dailev. 759 F.2d 192, 200 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Bermea. 
30 F.3d 1539, 1552 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Gundersen. 195 F.3d 1035, 1039 (8th Cir. 
1999); United States v. Yaibrough. 852 F.2d 1522,1537 (9th Cir. 1988); State v. Pilling. 721 F.2d 
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Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has noted that the ability to cross-examine a 
witness who is testifying as part of a plea bargain, as well as request a cautionary jury 
instruction, is part of the effective assistance of counsel to which a criminal defendant is 
entitled. Cash v. Culver. 358 U.S. 633, 637-38 (1959). Given this, the trial court in this 
case should have given the cautionary instruction requested by Mr. Guzman. 
This is further supported by the evidence law. Recently, some safeguards in the 
use of accomplice testimony have been modified or removed. Particularly, the traditional 
rule that a defendant may not be convicted solely on the basis of the uncorroborated 
statements of a co-conspirator has been abandoned.30 Instead, the question of whether to 
admit the statements is now completely within the trial court's discretion. Gray. 717 P.2d 
at 1319. Further, the Bruton rule, which forbade the admission of a non-testifying co-
defendant's incriminating confessions, Bruton v. United States. 391 U.S. 123, 136 
(1968), has been eroded. Now, such confessions may be entered so long as references to 
the defendant are redacted and the jury is instructed that the statement should be 
considered only with regard to the co-defendant. State v. Calliham. 2002 UT 86, p 6 , 55 
P.3d 573; State v. Nield. 804 P.2d 537, 540 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
These developments in the evidence law provide strong support for a cautionary 
286, 297 (10th Cir. 1983). 
30
 State v. Gray. 717 P.2d 1313,1319 (Utah 1986). The old rule was codified by statute. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-18 (1980). The case of State v. Kerekes has a good evaluation of the 
rule. State v. Kerekes. 622 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1980). 
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instruction in this case, and even for most cases where a co-defendant testifies as part of 
a plea bargain. Traditional safeguards on accomplice evidence have been modified or 
abandoned, and trial judges have more discretion than ever in matters of accomplice 
evidence. But the precaution of a cautionary jury instruction is still available, and it is 
eminently appropriate in circumstances such as this, where there is strong reason to doubt 
accomplice evidence. As the federal cases show, a cautionary instruction brings to the 
jury's attention some factors that should be considered in evaluating the testimony of a 
plea-bargaining witness, but it does not compromise the substance of the testimony itself. 
Such an instruction should have been given in this case. 
The trial court's failure to give this instruction resulted in prejudice. This is 
because Mr. Fernandez' testimony was significant evidence against Mr. Guzman. It 
purported to show that Mr. Guzman planned the home robbery along with others, made 
the initial entry into the home, participated in tying Ms. Miller, and searched the home 
for items to rob. R. 254 [243-56]. Yet, this entire testimony is the result of Mr. 
Fernandez' plea bargain with the State, and so it is fundamentally less reliable than other 
kinds of evidence. At the least, a cautionary jury instruction should have been given to 
ensure that the jury carefully considered the circumstances of the testimony along with 
the testimony itself. Because an instruction was not given, Mr. Guzman's conviction 
should be reversed and this case remanded for a new trial which includes an instruction. 
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III. THE CUMULATED ERRORS IN THIS CASE RESULTED IN 
PREJUDICE 
In this case, Mr. Guzman was prejudiced by each of the evidentiary errors made in 
this case. The first error, of course, was the introduction of evidence that Ms. Miller was 
absolutely certain of her identifications of Mr. Guzman. The second error was the trial 
court's failure to caution the jury about Mr. Fernandez' testimony. Each error prejudiced 
this case, but the prejudicial effect of both of these errors together was even greater. 
Because of this, Mr. Guzman's conviction should be reversed and he should receive a 
new trial. 
This is shown by the cumulative error doctrine and a review of the identification 
evidence that was presented at trial. First of all, under the cumulative error doctrine, this 
Court "will reverse only if the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines [its] 
confidence . . . that a fair trial was had."31 In assessing this claim, this Court will 
"consider all the identified errors, as well as any errors we assume may have occurred." 
State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) (quotations omitted). Applying this 
standard to the facts of this case shows that there was prejudice here. 
Indeed, all of the evidence which supports the identification of Mr. Guzman as the 
perpetrator in this case is undermined by the errors in this case. First, the principal 
identification evidence here is the identifications provided by Ms. Miller. These 
31
 State v. Harmon. 956 P.2d 262, 277 (Utah 1998) (quotations omitted). See also State v. 
Jimenez, 2001 UT App 68, f7,21 P.3d 1142; State v. Cardall 1999 UT 51,1f26, 982 P.2d 79. 
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identifications consisted of: 1) a description of the gunman, which was that he was 
wearing blue jeans, a blue-and-white flannel-type shirt, and that he was Hispanic; R. 253 
[145]; 254 [215, 229]; 2) evidence that Ms. Miller was absolutely certain of her photo 
identification of Mr. Guzman R. 253 [142-43]; R 254 [211]; 3) evidence that Ms. Miller 
was " 100 percent" certain of her in-person identification of Mr. Guzman; R. 253 [147], 
and 4) Ms. Miller's in-court identification of Mr. Guzman. R. 253 [126-27]. 
But all of this evidence is undermined by the fact that the trial court admitted 
evidence of Ms. Miller's confidence in her identifications. As shown in the first section, 
there is no correlation between a witness' certainty of an identification and the 
identification's accuracy. Long, 721 P.2d at 491. In fact, as the Long Court and other 
courts have noted, "the accuracy of an identification is, at times, inversely related to the 
confidence with which it is made." Long, 721 P.2d at 490. See also People v. Wright, 
755 P.2d 1049, 1059 (Cal. 1988). Yet, jurors are, in general, unaware of this and give 
such evidence great weight. Id, at 490; Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness 
Confidence and Witness Accuracy: Assenssing Their Forensic Relation, 1 Psych. Pub. 
Pol. And L. 817, 830 (1995). Indeed, studies have shown that evidence that a witness is 
confident in an identification decreases the amount of attention jurors give to important 
identification conditions. Id. This is particularly true if the witness claims to be 100 
percent certain of an identification, Id. at 830, as Ms Miller claimed in this case. 
Because of this, the introduction of evidence that Ms. Miller was absolutely 
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certain of her identifications undermines all of Ms. Miller's identification evidence. It 
undermines the photo and in-person identifications because the certainty evidence 
applied directly to these identifications. It also undermines Ms. Miller's in-court 
identification because the effect of the certainty evidence spilled over to this 
identification. After all, jurors who learn that Ms. Miller was absolutely certain of her 
out-of-court identifications of Mr. Guzman will be unlikely to carefully scrutinize her 
identification of him in court. This leaves only Ms. Miller's pre-identification description 
of the perpetrator. But this is not enough to support the identification of Mr. Guzman 
because that description was too vague to identify anybody. The description consisted 
only of items of common clothing, blue jeans and a blue-and-white shirt, and her 
observation that the perpetrator was Hispanic. R. 253 [145]; 254 [215, 229]. The bottom 
line is that Ms. Miller's identification evidence was compromised because of the 
admission of evidence that she was certain of her out-of-court identifications. 
The only other identification evidence presented in this case is that of Mr. 
Fernandez. However, as shown in the preceding section, his entire testimony should be 
carefully scrutinized because he testified as part of a plea bargain and because there are 
inconsistencies between his trial testimony, his previous statement to police, and Ms. 
Miller's testimony. R. 254 [248, 250-74]. Because of this, the trial court should have 
given the jury a cautionary instruction, advising jurors to consider the facts of the plea 
bargain, Mr. Fernandez' criminal history, and the inconsistencies in his statements. But 
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the court did not do this. As a result, the jury's evaluation of Mr. Fernandez' testimony, 
and his identification evidence in particular, is not as reliable as it would have been with 
a cautionary instruction. 
All of this shows that all of the identification evidence presented in this case was 
affected either by the introduction of evidence that Ms. Miller was certain of her 
identifications, or the trial court's failure to caution the jury regarding Mr. Fernandez' 
testimony. The cumulative effect is that confidence in the jury's verdict is undermined,32 
and so the conviction should be reversed and this case remanded for a new trial without 
the errors described above. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Guzman requests that his conviction be reversed and this case be remanded 
for a new trial because of the prejudice that result from: 1) the trial court's erroneous 
admission of testimony about Ms. Miller's confidence in her identifications of Mr. 
Guzman; and 2) the trial court's failure to give the jury a cautionary instruction about Mr. 
Fernandez' testimony. 
32
 See Harmon, 956 P.2d at 277 (A conviction may be reversed for cumulative error if the 
errors are such that, together, they undermine our confidence in whether the defendant received a 
fair trial). 
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ADDENDUM A 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
LUIS ALBERTO GUZMAN, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 011909892 FS 
Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Date: October 18, 2002 
PRESENT 
Clerk: evelynt 
Reporter: MIDGLEY, ED 
Prosecutor: WISSLER, SIRENA M. 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): WILLIAMS, SCOTT 
Interpreter: GLORIA UPDEGROVE 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Language: Spanish 
Date of birth: January 28, 1981 
Video 
Tape Number: 10/18/02 Tape Count: 9:47/10:30 
CHARGES 
1. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 06/05/2002 Guilty 
2. AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 06/05/2002 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than six years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than fifteen years and which may be life in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Paae 1 
Case No: 011909892 
Date: Oct 18, 2002 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
These sentences are to run consecutively with each other, and 
concurrent with the sentence in case #021906112. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
Restitution order in amount of $2,398.18 victim reparation. Credit 
granted for 514 days served. 
Dated this fo day of (\Jky 20 Q 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
District Court Judge 
— — ;—:TOF^UDGE 
Paqe 2 ( l a s t ) 
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